On 11 March Gazprom website published the following information:

The Gazprom Headquarters today hosted a working meeting of Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Management Committee of Gazprom, Uzakbai Karabalin, President of KazMunaiGaz, Nurmmukhamad Akhmedov, Chairman of the Management Committee of Uzbekneftegaz and Yagshigeldy Kakaev, Chairman of Turkmengaz. The meeting addressed the outlook for cooperation in the gas sector.

During the meeting the heads of the gas companies from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan stated that “based upon the interests of the national economies and considering the international commitments with regard to the energy supply reliability and continuity, starting from 2009 natural gas will be sold at European prices”.

This information has immediately caused a sensation and produced a number of comments in the Russian and Western media. Most of the commentators have proclaimed the emergence of a gas OPEC in the Central Asia, with members as follows: Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and… Russia. Media also anticipated problems that Ukraine will face after the expected rise of gas prices. Above all, the news was considered as the success of Moscow who - by announcing the information - has allegedly hampered the construction of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, instead pushing the Caspian Coastal gas pipeline ahead.

Arkady Dubnov of ‘Vremya Novostey’ wrote:

‘Clearly, the cartel’s emergence has been triggered by American and European diplomatic activity in the region. This activity focused on lobbying an export route of the Central Asian gas to Europe that would circumvent Russia. Paradoxically, Gazprom’s consent for the ultimatum will decisively bury the Trans-Caspian project, backed by Washington. (…) Moreover, it will reinforce the common urge of Russia and its Central Asian partners to construct the Caspian Coastal gas pipeline.

The activity of Brussels and Washington envoys, who have been persuading Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov and Nursultan Nazarbayev to support the Trans-Caspian pipeline, has played a vital part, too. (…). By late February a special US representative in the region Steven Mann actively traveled between Baku, Ashgabat and Astana, luring local leaders with promises of European prices for gas. (…) However, the Central Asian leaders have opted for an easier way of obtaining extra funds for their gas and started joint talks with Gazprom.’

Nonetheless, the Central Asian ultimatum issued to Moscow makes me draw different conclusions. In my opinion, it may be a proof of Moscow’s weakness. The ineffectiveness of Russian policy in the region is being cunningly used by Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One of the key principles of Russian policy in the whole post-Soviet area has been to divide the former republics as much as possible and to prevent them from coordinating their policies. Suddenly it turned out that Ashgabat, Tashkent and Astana have joined forces and started dictating their terms to Moscow.

Besides, the fact that Russia may pay ‘European prices’ for the Central Asian gas next year does not necessarily mean that the Great Game is over and that the West and China have nothing to look for in the region. It should be born in mind that the Central Asian states are concerned with something more than just money. They also strive to become politically independent of Moscow and to balance Russia’s influence in the region by cooperation with China and the West. Uzbekistan’s recent permission for Americans to use the airbase in Termez might be an illustration to this point.

Why then did the Russians disclose this information themselves? A simple answer comes to mind: what else could they do? They must have realized that they are no longer dealing with separate states but, willingly or not, they must face the three states together. They also realized that paying more for gas is unavoidable. Therefore Moscow must have decided to use this unpleasant information to cause some confusion around the Trans-Caspian pipeline and to demonstrate that it is capable of paying more for gas, so in this sense the West has no advantage over Russia.

The fact is, something like a ‘Central Asian gas OPEC’ has indeed emerged. However, it is made of three and not four members.