This post is part of the crossblog survey “2007 in retrospect”. You can also vote on the most important event of 2007 in our online poll. 

Exactly one year ago, on 21 December 2006, the world learnt about the death of Saparmurat Niyazov. Long forgotten by the international media and isolated on the international stage Turkmenistan suddenly became the centre of attention. All commentators and analysts were wondering about the country’s future. Some of them predicted internal destabilization and struggle for power between members of Turkmenbashi’s entourage, but the hope that things would change for the better prevailed. It was, first of all, expected that the totalitarian regime would falter; the bolder ones even counted on reforms and a critical review of Niyazov’s rule. The situation in Turkmenistan was often compared to the one in the USSR after Stalin’s death and the new Turkmen president Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov was compared to Nikita Khurshchev. Those who drew this analogy assumed that he would break with the totalitarian past, condemn Niyazov’s “mistakes” and at least partially liberalize the system.

However, nothing like that has happened. Despite some minor changes like education reforms, reinstatement of pensions and freedom of movement or opening of a few Internet cafes, the foundations of Niyazov’s regime have remained unchanged. Niyazov’s post was simply occupied by a new man, who very quickly slipped into his new role.

Adjar Kurtov, one of Russia’s best specialists on Central Asia, has written a very interesting article published on the www.ferghana.ru website in which he analyses Berdymukhammedov’s rise to power and the development of internal situation in Turkmenistan following Turkmenbashi’s death. He points out that Turkmenistan’s political system is very stable, which has been confirmed by the change in the country’s highest office. It has also proved that there are no serious conflicts within the ranks of the present Turkmen ruling elite and that the conviction that the system created by Niyazov should be continued persists. I would just add here that the fact of the change in the president’s office taking place without any external interference is very symptomatic.

The main point Kuratov makes is that the political system in Turkmenistan has not changed under Berdymukhammedov’s rule.

Berdymukhammedov acted cautiously and prudently. He did not try to appear as a revolutionist or a reformer, but as Niyazov’s successor, and he indeed became one. Gurbanguly Myalikgulyevich changed practically nothing in the framework of the Turkmen totalitarianism created by Niyazov. Moreover, with the passing of time, Berdymukhammedov started talking openly about the need to continue the course of constitutional reforms of his predecessor […] In other words, Berdymukhammedov launched individual social, cultural and even economic reforms without introducing any political change.

Nevertheless, I think that the picture of the passing year would be incomplete if we left out Berdymukhammedov’s foreign policy which has changed completely as compared to the one led by his predecessor. First of all, it has become more active which seems to be the result of the clear definition of its goals that include: ending the country’s isolation (1); diversification of gas export routes (2); gaining independence from Russia in this area (3); attracting foreign investors to the oil and gas sector (4); maximization of profit from the sale of resources (5).

Berdymukhammedov’s foreign visits were the key element of his hitherto foreign policy. He has already visited all important countries engaged in the rivalry for influence in Central Asia, i.e.: Russia, the U.S., China and the EU. He has also been to Iran and Kazakhstan and made the so-called small hajj to Mekka. During his meetings, he has always declared the willingness to establish close relations, cooperation in the area of energy resources, and expressed support for all suggested pipeline routes which made an impression that it’s the other countries that seek to enter into cooperation with Ashgabat not the other way round.

Berdymukhammedov has remained Niyazov’s faithful follower on the internal scene, but he cannot be denied success in foreign policy. His main achievements include: launching of the gas pipeline construction to China; establishing good relations with the West; making Russia pay 30 per cent more for the Turkmen gas; a definite improvement in relations with the neighbouring countries (Iran, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan); launching of the railway line construction linking Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran; improvement of Turkmenistan’s image abroad.

To sum up, the following conclusion could be drawn: as far as internal policy is concerned, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov fully deserves the title of Turkmenbashi II in the negative sense. However, in the area of foreign policy he turned out to be much more far-sighted and his actions are bringing profits not only to him and his entourage, but are also in line with the national interest of Turkmenistan.