Turkmenistan is the second-biggest producer and exporter of natural gas in the CIS, after Russia. The vast majority of its supplies go to Russia’s Gazprom monopoly in order to be re-exported to Ukraine and lucrative markets abroad.

Gazprom supplies about one-fifth of gas consumed by the European Union.

This is Peter’s comment on Abdulgamid’s post:

Combine with this that the much-vaunted intergovernmental committee between Russia and Turkmenistan, which is ostensibly charged with making sure the Caspian pipeline goes to plan, faltering in its early steps.
The provisional pre-deal signed in Krasnovodsk in May was meant to be wrapped up already, but signs are that it may not even be concluded within the year. This has permutations for Russian politics also, as the man representing Moscow’s interests in these negotiations is a close Putin ally and possible presidential hopeful, Sergei Naryshkin.
The truth is that the Turkmen government, in spite of the passing of Niyazov, simply cannot resist the urge of making promises it doesn’t know it can keep.
My own view is that for all that Russia may be a capricious energy partner, we do not want it running out of export gas. (Needless to say, I speak as a self-interested European in this situation).
If no satisfactory and impartial gas reserves are conducted in the next couple of years, then we have very legitimate grounds on which to question the viability of Turkmenistan as a business partner. It is extraordinary to me that this one gesture, which could potentially have marginally damaging effects in the medium-term, would have the immediate effect of exponentially multiplying foreign investment.
It’s a no-brainer; businessmen want to deal with people who are not lying to them or concealing the facts.