The highlight of last week’s Khalk Maslahty gathering, as reported by the international media, was the election of President Kurbanguly Berdymukhammedov as its chairman.
In a show of support reminiscent of the rule of the late President Saparmurat Niyazov, Berdymukhammedov’s installation to the position was reportedly endorsed by a unanimity of around 2,500 members of the council. This has been widely read as a continuation of Niyazov’s authoritarian political practices. A Ferghana.ru analysis prior to the event is broadly indicative of this general view:

“The alignment of forces in the upper echelons of power depends on who will head the Khalk Maslahaty in its current form. If the incumbent president becomes its chairman (and this very scenario would be logical from the viewpoint of the existing regime), one may surely say that Ashgabat is not going to destroy the system brought about under Niyazov’s rule.”

However, a proper understanding of this development requires a complete assessment of Berdymukhammedov’s position in the current ruling order and the actual significance of the institution of the Khalk Maslahaty.
Early examinations of the new president’s effective grip over the rule of the country had Berdymukhammedov cast in the role of a hostage to forces operating behind the scene. As quoted on this blog, RIA-Novosti commentator Andrei Grozin wrote in late December that:

“Sixty year-old Defense Minister Agageldy Mamedgeldyyev is the oldest from Niyazov’s entourage, and, hence most likely to head the Khalk Maslahaty.”

That prediction has turned out to be incontrovertibly incorrect and suggests that Berdymukhammedov, for now at least, does command some degree of genuine authority. In that respect, the Khalk Maslahaty’s collective decision, certainly imposed rather than autonomously undertaken, hints towards stability and continuity instead of deepening dictatorial tendencies. Taking matters at face value, the only decision that could have followed from the electorate’s resounding choice was the installation of Berdymukhammedov as chairman of the Khalk Maslahaty. Following the logic of Turkmen institutions, any other option would have rung not only as perverse but also disconcerting. The election of a military figurehead or a puppet candidate would have been more cause for concern than the course that has been taken.

Misreading these events is also subject to misconception of what the Khalk Maslahaty actually is. The body shares precious little with any Western notions of democracy and its undermining cannot consequently be interpreted as an inherently dictatorial development. While important decisions are adopted in this forum, they are not usually discussed or questioned. This may be just as well, as the constituents of the body can hardly be said to be representative of political procedures recognisable to modern democracies. Members of the Khalk Maslahaty are, in all likelihood, not qualified or willing to engage in the kind of debate and policy-forming that one would normally expect of representative organs.

The people’s council is little more than a pseudo-popular gathering that Niyazov’s regime cobbled together from remnants of the Soviet-style assemblies and half-baked co-opting of tribal affiliations. In that sense, Berdymuhammedov’s placement as its head serves to underscore the purely formal role it has to play in national decision-making.

Curiously enough, the actual role of the Khalk Maslahaty was the main item on the agenda for the council. In what seems like a compromise with the power ministry wing of the Turkmen government, a constitutional amendment was adopted decreeing that in the event of the chairman of being unable to fulfil his duties, the body could be convened by the Security Council.
Perhaps more significantly, a further amendment was made to the effect that the Khalk Maslahaty chairman, the parliament, the Cabinet, the Galkinish social movement and one-fourth of the people’s council are eligible to table proposals to the Khalk Maslahaty.