In Slow Succession
Russian daily Noviye Izvestiya has speculated that President Saparmurat Niyazov may be succeeded by his son, Murad Saparmurat, in an article published in Tuesday’s issue. It cited Murad Saparmurat’s visit to Dubai last Saturday during which he acted as the head official representative for the Turkmen government as evidence for this claim. The brief tour covered issues of trade and economic cooperation between the United Arab Emirates and Turkmenistan, including the possibility of regular scheduled flights being established between Ashgabat and Dubai. As Noviye Izvestiya reports:
“During talks with Murad Niyazov, the Director General of the UAE Chamber of Commerce and Industry Abdul Rahman Ghanim Al Mutaiwee suggested to his Turkmen visitor that the two nations, united by their ‘Muslim culture and social attitudes’, should strengthen relations. These ties will be formalised by the setting up of regular Emirates flights to Ashgabat, Turkmenistan’s regular participation in trade exhibitions in Dubai, and the opening of Turkmen Consulate in the capital of the UAE. We [Noviye Izvestiya] would also note that until now such matters have been dealt with personally by Saparmurat Niyazov himself.”
In spite of an obvious lack of candidates to succeed Niyazov, the issue is one that he has raised on earlier occasions. During a Khalk Maslahty session in October 2005, Niyazov remarked that 2009 would mark the year in which elections would be held to find a new president.
“In 2009, we will hold the elections for another president. By that time, in four or five years, we will raise a worthy successor. There is nothing eternal. One cannot be eternal.”
In truth, however, such promises have become a regular occurrence and are routinely greeted with unanimous pleading from the Khalk Maslahty that Niyazov remain in power. The Khalk Maslahty, which remains Turkmenistan’s closest analogue to a representative institution, first decreed Niyazov president for life in 1999. He has since offered numerous timeframes for a subsequent presidential election, but a date has yet to be carved in stone.
As suggested earlier, the most immediate difficulty surrounding succession is that paucity of likely candidates. Murad Niyazov is intermittently mentioned in connection with this eventuality, but Kazakh political analyst Konstantin Syroyezhkin is sceptical about this scenario. As he notes in comments to Noviye Izvestiya:
“Niyazov is a political loner and has no developed system of family connections, therefore, he can have no heir.”
However, Heydar Aliev set a precedent in the region by performing a similar operation in handing over power to his son, Ilham. Although Geydar Aliev died in 2003, a personality cult in his honour still persists, an outcome that could easily be replicated in Turkmenistan. Indeed, as with Heydar Aliev, the issue of Niyazov’s succession may be forced by ill-health. Niyazov’s health is subject of much speculation and some suggest that he may not have many more years to live.
Inevitably, rumours about Saparmurat Niyazov’s succession are often speculative and fanciful in view of the scarce information that observers have to go on. Yet it is not hard to feel that Murad Niyazov’s suitability for his father’s position is severely questionable. To begin with, as Noviye Izvestiya’s article notes, he has little political capital upon which to base his putative authority, and his job hitherto in energy (and possibly arms) trading in Vienna does not position him ideally to amend this problematic situation. In an exchange on this site some months back, Turkmen blogger Karakum also observed that “while Heydar [Aliev] was always more of an asset for Ilham, Murad’s father is and will be his strongest political liability”. Karakum also suggested that Murad Niyazov was not an “indecent person”, yet there is no shortage of gossip about embarrassing indiscretions. The most notable example of these is the rumour that he once spent $12 million in the course of one night’s gambling in a Spanish casino.
Such background information thus makes the potential for Murad Niyazov to rule his country highly unlikely. Were he to want to take over the reins, however, one aspect that plays in his favour is time. The implacable rate of cadre turnover is emptying the Turkmen halls of power of most presidential hopefuls. In the event that no viable candidates were to emerge and that Saparmurat Niyazov’s health was indeed to worsen as rapidly as some hypothesise, the playing field would be wide open and Murad could feasibly stand to benefit.
on July 5th, 2006 at 12:33 pm
The question of Murad goes beyond his very real lack of political capital, in my eyes. Niyazov has pushed the issue of being a ‘pure blood’ Turkmen to extremes with regard to governmental and state positions, requiring at least three generations of ‘pure’ Turkmen-ness. Of course, Murad’s mother is Russian, so that doesn’t help the cult of nationality (alongside personality) that Niyazov has built up. There has been some suggestion that Niyazov recently changed stance to emphasis the Islamic nature of Turkmenistan over and above its genealogical unity, in part to accommodate Murad. This seems to me to hold little weight because as well as being Russian, Murad’s mother is also of Jewish origin from what I know. Which may make Niyazov’s push for ‘pure’ Turkmen and Islamic incompatible with his son? Just an idea.
However, it is true that Murad has been seen far more frequently in Ashbagat and perhaps Niyazov, despite the aforementioned contradictions, would give his blessing to a Murad succession. Other than the obvious example in Azerbaijan, look at Nazarbayeva and Karimova in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan respectively - potential Central Asian dynasties are very much in vogue right now.
Another point is all this rejection of the 2009 elections talk. Yes Niyazov has come up with many lies in the past, but to me at least the fact that he has talked about 2009/2010 for so long does indicate that something is afoot. There is a danger in rejecting everything Niyazov says - he is a largely rational and intelligent individual (if he were not he would not still be in power) and it is too easy to paint him as a crazy paranoid fool. He has described Turkmenistan’s tribes as its Achilles Heel and I personally think that’s a pretty spot-on description. This isn’t saying there are any positive redeeming features to the man - he is a ruthless, self-enriching, detached and murderous man willing to do anything to hold on to power, as we all know, just that we shouldn’t misjudge him. Anyway, back to the election - While it may be a case of biding time this does not mean that something significant may not happen. The handing over of formidable power to the People’s Council recently suggests to me a system in which Niyazov (as ‘lifelong president’ or somesuch grandiose term) pulls the strings behind a puppet president (most likely a Presidential Guard unknown from the Ahal-Teke tribe) in a game of smoke and mirrors. This would still be a huge step (in who knows which direction) for Turkmenistan and could preempt broader changes perhaps.
The idea of there being a power vacuum with no viable candidates is also an interesting one and I’m not sure where I stand on this. What about all those ‘revolving door’ politicians who are still in country and with the connections to act? What about the KNB? And Presidential Guard? And anyone who could take a lead of the masses of unpaid conscripts that is the army? And criminal elements? And regional/tribal elites? Clearly the oppositions in exile hold little sway but there ares still people in the country. Murad is a possibility but perhaps not as the only option but one of many.
Food for thought.
on July 5th, 2006 at 1:42 pm
Well quite. As your observations indicate, second-guessing in a scenario brimming over with variables is a fool’s job. When writing the original post, I was doing it with a view to Niyazov contemplating succession in terms of his declining health. In actual fact, lest we think he is about to drop dead from one day to the next, he is only 66 and has a small army of top class German doctors at his beck and call. In that sense, I would strongly favour the possibility that you posit; namely, that he will seek to install a puppet administration while continuing to perform a semi-regal role. His promotion to a meta-deity will go some way in preserving his legitimacy over any attendant president.
This nonetheless would leave some outstanding problems. First, the identity of a new nominal leader still remains crucial, as this person would invariably become the institutional face of Turkmenistan. Second, if we accept that Niyazov is keen to see his legacy perpetuated, which I do, then future leadership will remain an issue closer to him than to pseudo- or semi-parliamentary organisations.
The possibility of Niyazov’s cult outliving him strikes me as fairly dubious. Even discounting the dynastic element, I still think that Azerbaijan remains the main point of reference in analysing this process, as it that country which has maintained a necropolitical personality cult. I feel that one key difference is that Aliev had a symbolic legacy in the form of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, which most Azeris still perceive as a struggle for national integrity. Niyazov has only his personalised ideology upon which his myth could be founded, and I am profoundly hopeful that most of that will go straight out of the window the moment he draws his last breath.
But to return to the predicting game, I am sure I am wrong, but as things now stand the whole strikes me as little more than a grotesque roulette wheel. The final outcome depends entirely on where the spinning plate stands when the ball drops. So, as things currently stand, the KNB looks to have gained power and influence in favour of the General Procuracy. Murad’s theoretical ascendancy could further change the emphasis on Turkmenicity. On the international level, Turkmenistan is looking at a shift towards its eastern neighbours, with all the concomitant influence this could come to bear on domestic politics. Throw in a round of mini-power struggles at the local level in the upcoming elections plus all the elements you raised and the picture looks much more vibrant and dynamic than we normally give credit for.
on July 5th, 2006 at 7:12 pm
Good comments all around. Peter’s reference to the roulette wheel is fitting, and to me it seems that whoever comes to power after Niyazov will do so because he/she/they was/were in a position of power when the other shoe dropped. I do think that Niyazov, in true megalomaniac fashion, may look to his son to carry on, and that this trip to Dubai could be the beginning of a process to develop Murad as a successor. Whether or not Murad will have enough of a power structure/base to eventually grasp the reigns of leadership is not so clear. And, as Karakum asserted in an earlier reply re: “life in Turkmenistan after Niyazov”, the father probably will not benefit his son after his death, and may instead be a liability. It will be interesting to see how things pan out. But, in the coming months and years, if Murad continues to make high level appearances that do not seem to jive with his previous life as a behind-the-scenes playboy, we will most certainly be returning to this debate.
on July 6th, 2006 at 1:39 pm
I was just wondering where Murad is based these days - still Vienna? If so, are there any indications that he may move ‘back home’ in an effort to cement relations and power structures? I am sure the lack of both of these will not have been missed.
The whole ‘prediction game’ has limitations of course - we don’t know what’s going to happen and shouldn’t feel ashamed to say so. But I don’t think a rejection of future talk is helpful (and I’m not suggesting anyone here is completely rejecting this talk). Remembering when independence came to Turkmenistan (in that direction), people were surprised by the collapse of the USSR and in that surprise Niyazov was able to capitalise. If we don’t begin to imagine what a Turkmenistan without Turkmenbashi might look like then we too will caught off guard as will the people of Turkmenistan.
I do wonder the extent to which Niyazov is an Ashbagat/Ahal region centric leader - I know there are far less posters out of the centre - are there any clear reasons for this. Does anyone know about the supposedly important split between the Merv-Tekke and Ahal-Tekke?
I know I’m asking more questions than answering here but isn’t that always the way with Turkmenistan?!
on July 7th, 2006 at 6:56 am
I am trying to recollect circumstances of the last elite rotation in Turkmenistan - that of 1985, when Niyazov came to power. We will tend to dismiss any direct parallels between the two - and for right reasons - however that elite rotation seems to be the only in-country precedent in a generation, and as such might offer some insights.
When Niyazov came to power, he was stepping into an emptied field - somewhat similar to how his successor(s) will have to be fill the power vacuum (though back in 70s-80s political opponents were never physically eliminated). His immediate predecessor was Muhammed Gapurov, who led the republic for 10+ years, and - as intimidated as he always felt by the Ashgabat elites, himself coming from a provincial town and a weak clan - in the process eliminated all credible contestants for power. If that interests anyone, later I can share additional details about these power dynamics (in my interpretation), at this stage it will suffice to say that the three of his most likely successors were either out of job (Oraz Orazmuhamedov), or out of Moscow’s favor (Chary Karryev), or out of Turkmenistan (Tahir Durdyev). Looking for protection from Gapurov’s increasingly bold and reckless entourage some members of other ruling factions pledged allegiance to … powerful and charismatic mob leader Akmurat Nuryev.
Before further digressions, what made Niyazov eventually acceptable to all - by virtue of his persona, background and political actions - were credible guarantees he was able to offer to various groups in the elite and intelligentsia:
- to the emerging class of enterpreneurs and capitalists - protection of their property and other assets (to many of them Niyazov’s ascendance this was particularly reassuring in face of nightmarish scenario of an alliance between Akmurat and parts of nomenklatura)
- to intelligentsia - a dosage of liberalism in cultural affairs, academic freedom and transition from overly dogmatic ideological control in late 70s-early 80s
- to security apparatus - return to law and order
- to “delegates” of Tekke clans in power - prospects of internal truce between disenfranchised and vocal sub-factions and promise of regaining political turf vs. other factions
- to regional elites - assurances of not letting quarrels within the central apparatus to spillover to their constituencies
- to non-Turkmens in the elite and the intelligentsia - prospects of temporary suspension or of slowing down of the increasingly assertive rise of their Turkmen counterparts to domination
- and of course to Moscow he seemed to be fit as competent change agent, shrewd tactician and, at the same time, sufficiently dependent on them in terms of the sources of power.
Will anybody after Niyazov be up to this job, esp. now that internal tensions and problems might be of much higher order.
on July 7th, 2006 at 7:11 am
Last sentence was meant to end with question mark.
Since 1985 relative weights of the broad groupings - as well as their preferences - have changed, but essentially all of them are still in place and will be able to influence the transition (at least by revealing their preferences) in one way or another . I very much doubt that Niyazov’s son will be able to the future demands of various groups and repeat his father’s success, especially since his room for maneuver is going to be so much more narrower because of, inter alia, huge political liability of being his farther’s son.
On a separate note, I am as much convinced (if not more) as I used to be months ago that upcoming elections, as much farcical they are likely to be, in progression from the lowest municipality to velayat can set stage for future political changes in the country.
on July 7th, 2006 at 12:37 pm
To Karakum
The current socio-political environment in Turkmenistan bears little if any resemblance to what was back in the 80s when Niyazov came to power.
Since taking power, Niyazov has made every possible effort to weaken the social cohesion within society and, while successfully marginalizing and squelching old Soviet-era elites, he has managed to keep in check emerging new ones. Resulting from this is a virtually elite-free society characteristic of today’s Turkmenistan, not to mention the absence of organized groups acting as conduits for vested interests.
In this context, a scenario of even weak-willed Murad succeeding his father as president is still among likely options. If internal demand/pressure is not a factor, nor is it a stumbling block on Murad’s path to the presidency, what about external source of pressure? If such pressure does arise, where is it likely to come from?
on July 7th, 2006 at 3:35 pm
Karakum, as you mentioned before, I’d be very interested to hear more about the dynamics behind Niyazov’s rise to power in 1985. From the Soviet books about Turkmenistan (circa 1983 or 1984) that I’ve glanced at, Niyazov seemed to be back in the pack of likely candidates to take over from Gapurov. He was a presence, surely, but there were others ahead of him. Exactly how he rose to power is a scenario that myself and other colleagues have often pondered.
on October 30th, 2006 at 5:47 pm
Oct. 25, 2005Print
Turkmenbashi Votes Against Himself…
// The president for life is looking for worthy successor
Democracy
Yesterday, Saparmurat Niyazov, life-time Turkmen President announced that by the year 2009 there will be elections for a new head of the state. He also promised “to grow a worthy successor within four-five years.” It is not a first time, when Turkmenbashi (official local title of the President of Turkmenistan) promises to bring democracy to his country – usually these promises end up with big repressions.
Failed Initiative of the President
Yesterday XVI session of Khalk Maskhalat (People’s Council) under the chairmanship of President Saparmurat Niyazov in Ashgabat turned out to be the most shocking in the history of the existence of this bizarre organ. Even before this session, the actions of People’s Council were making specialists bewildered. It is mostly for the reason that nobody can comprehend a legitimacy of this state body. All 2507 members of this highest Turkmen power organ are not elected, but according to the law, they represent all the regions and districts of the country. Besides, the People’s Council co-exists with elected parliament of Turkmenia –Mejlis. However, in recent years all the powers of Mejlis gradually went to Khalk Maskhalat.
Yesterday, mysterious Khalk Maskhalat made unprecedented decision. For a first time in the history of Turkmenistan the project of the law proposed by the president himself was rejected. Moreover, 2506 out of 2507 members of the People’s Council voted against the project of the law. Only one vote went for the law – the vote of the life-time Chairman of Khalk Maskhalat Saparmurat Niyazov.
The scandalous project of the law was about the presidential elections in Turkmenia. “Nothing is forever. Nobody is forever,” Turkmenbashi said, while presenting to the members of the council the newly born project of the law. Using this philosophical statement, Niyazov suggested having elections in 2009 – right before his 70th Birthday. “In 2009 we will elect new president. Before that time, within four –five years, we will grow a worthy successor,” the president promised.
In response the members of Khalk Maskhalat started to chant “People! Motherland! Great Turkmenbashi!” and many times interrupted the president’s speech. When the time came to vote, the project of the law was decisively rejected. However, the president was still disagree with the opinion of the People’s Council and offered just to postpone the adoption of this law until December of 2009. “In the project of the law there is an article, which says that the president can ask about unscheduled elections, for instance, for the health reason. The health is not getting better with the years and after 70 it is hard to rule the country,” Turkmenbashi complained.
Unstoppable Drive to Democracy
The suggestion about having the presidential elections in Turkmenia was made by Niyazov already for several times. He started to insist on this idea right after Khalk Maskhalat appointed him as the life-time president, which has right to be re-elected as many times as Niyazov wishes.
In 2001, on the day of his 61st Birthday, Niyazov announced that it is difficult to rule the country after reaching age of 70. It was then, when he mentioned the date of his departure –2010. This announcement was made after the series of cadres shuffle. Within one year of 2000, Turkmenbashi changed the content of his government and presidential administration by nearly 70 percent. About ten Vice Prime Ministers (the position of the Prime Minister is also held by Saparmurat Niyazov and the Vice Prime Minister is the #2 official in the country after Turkmenbashi) were changed. The large scale sweeps were conducted in Central Bank, Foreign Ministry, Agriculture Ministry, Education Ministry and law-enforcements.
After the President’s statement about his unavoidable departure, the quiet time has settled in Turkmenia for about six months. During this time Niyazov was able to correct his plans: Turkmenbashi said that he might leave already in 2008. However, as soon as Turkmenbashi said that, the highest authorities of the country were submerged again into the purge. The head of the railroads lost his position first – he was run over by a train. His successor was able to hold on to the chair only for couple more months. Within few months the heads of the law-enforcements, Central Bank, Customs and several Vice Prime Ministers were replaced. The logical end for this power shuffle was another session of Khalk Maskhalat in August of 2002, which announced Niyazov as life-time President of Turkmenistan. The members of the council also decided to rename the months of the year and days of the week. January was called Turkmenbashi and April, for instance, was re-named after the President’s mother.
Simultaneously, there was another new rule introduced – the age divisions. A human life was divided by 12 cycles. The youth and young adulthood was coming after 30, and the “age of inspiration” was coming between 61 and 73. Coincidently, President Niyazov was 62 in that period.
The further development of the democracy happened in Turkmenia according to already tested screen-play. In November of 2002 new series of the brutal repressions started again. According to the official theory, on November 25 several foreign terrorists (Chechens, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, and few treacherous Turkmen officials) made an assassination attempt on Turkmenbashi. His armored Mercedes was shot at from a carbine and pistol. The court process of the century has started, during of which the police broom swept Speaker of the Parliament, heads of the Foreign Ministry, law-enforcements’ Generals, and several governors. The process was over with new promise from Turkmenbashi to leave his post. Right before his 63rd Birthday, Saparmurat Niyazov announced about the presidential elections in 2008 -2010, “if there would be the will of Allah.” In the same time, he asked his associates to reinforce their authority among the people and start to compete for the right to be called a successor.
The overachieving competitors were fired after several months and ended up in jail for a long time. By December of 2003 all the heads of law-enforcements lost their jobs. The Prosecution officers, who were purging the Turkmen organs of power “from the terrorists”, soon also found themselves under the giant sweeping broom.
So, the current promise of Turkmenbashi about the approaching departure was followed by the same logic. He finished the massive wave of the repressions with a fresh statement about the elections, thus promising again to survived officials that they would be the ones who would receive the power from Niyazov’s weakening hands. The traditional purges were conducted this summer as well: such well established figures as Redjep Saparov, former head of the presidential administration, and Elly Gurbanmuradov, Vice Prime Minister (both of them were considered as possible successors) lost their positions. Turkmenbashi sent a signal to new people, who came to replace Saparov and Gurbanmuradov. The president hinted that everyone from the newly arrived replacements has a chance to become a successor one day.
The Power Guarding Service
According to the Turkmen law, if the president is unable to perform his duties, the highest post in the state goes to the Deputy Chairman of Khalk Maskhalat. However, during the last purge the most potential candidate for the top position — Deputy Chairman of the People’s Council Rejep Saparov — was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
It would be safe to bet that before 2009 Saparmurat Niyazov would perform many his classic purges of the officials, who came too close to the throne. According to the opinion of some experts, Niyazov does that just to clear up the room for his own son Murad. Until now, Murad was only involved in business –he controls all oil-gas industry of Turkmenistan. However, according to the sources in Ashgabat, the son is not against the idea to become soon Turkmenbashi II.
The situation in Ashgabat could develop not only by the tested screen-plays of life-time President. Starting recently, the presidential bodyguards are taking the leading places in the ruling elite. Turkmenbashi’s former personal bodyguard Aganiyaz Akyev already took the position of Vice Prime Minister – it was him, who represented the country during the recent CIS summit in Kazan, where he officially announced about Turkmenistan’s quitting the Confederation. Another presidential bodyguard – Iklymberdy Paromov – already has a post of Deputy Foreign Minister. Finally, despite all the purges, the Chief of the Presidential Guard Akmurad Rejepov, was able to keep all his influence on the President Niyazov. The role of the bodyguards increased so much that experts cannot exclude the possibility of their participation in the final power sharing. So, it is not a fact, that Turkmenbashi will be successful in purging his close surrounding before his another democratic drive.
Taken from: http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=620638
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