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	<title>Comments on: Caspian Diversion</title>
	<link>http://turkmenistan.neweurasia.net/2006/05/06/caspian-diversion/</link>
	<description>Just another WordPress weblog</description>
	<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 11:30:42 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Peter</title>
		<link>http://turkmenistan.neweurasia.net/2006/05/06/caspian-diversion/#comment-773</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 May 2006 06:45:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://turkmenistan.neweurasia.net/2006/05/06/caspian-diversion/#comment-773</guid>
		<description>I have also viewed the viability of this project somewhat sceptically, but for the sake of argument, the entry of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU puts Turkmenistan three countries away from EU markets (not considering Greece, which is physically isolated by the FY, Albania and the sea). I am no expert, so I don't know how EU candidates fit into European designs on future energy plans.
At any rate, the Trans-Caspian route mentioned in this story has been raised again to use as a bogeyman to scare the Russians. The strongest evidence that little practical progress will be made imminently on this proposal is in the history of wavering interest rather than the potential future.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have also viewed the viability of this project somewhat sceptically, but for the sake of argument, the entry of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU puts Turkmenistan three countries away from EU markets (not considering Greece, which is physically isolated by the FY, Albania and the sea). I am no expert, so I don&#8217;t know how EU candidates fit into European designs on future energy plans.<br />
At any rate, the Trans-Caspian route mentioned in this story has been raised again to use as a bogeyman to scare the Russians. The strongest evidence that little practical progress will be made imminently on this proposal is in the history of wavering interest rather than the potential future.</p>
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		<title>By: karakum</title>
		<link>http://turkmenistan.neweurasia.net/2006/05/06/caspian-diversion/#comment-772</link>
		<dc:creator>karakum</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 May 2006 01:23:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://turkmenistan.neweurasia.net/2006/05/06/caspian-diversion/#comment-772</guid>
		<description>Apparently the project's prospects have very weak correlation, much less causality relations, with the Europeans or Americans' political declarations.

Even should these parties subsribe a relatively moderate cost of $2.5bn, the project is still going to face prospects of political instability in South Caucasus and Kurdish-populated areas of Eastern Turkey. Even should the political risk be totally eliminated, the gas will still need to be brought from Turkey through Balkans to more developed and mature markets of Central and Western Europe - all at additional cost. Even if these transit countries suddenly offer a market potential sufficient to sustain return on initial investment, more will be required to build additional infrastructure (regional and local gas grids, underground storage facilities, etc.). As far as I can see, the project is a no-go.

Which is not necessarily bad for us, Turkmens. All the more reason to start developing naitonal chemical industry, processing natural gas, oil and their various fractions into value-added goods with low long-haul transportation costs, or more power plants to sell electricity to neighbors. The Europeans will have to sort out their energy problems themselves, not at the account of locking in our economic prospects for another 20-30 years.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Apparently the project&#8217;s prospects have very weak correlation, much less causality relations, with the Europeans or Americans&#8217; political declarations.</p>
<p>Even should these parties subsribe a relatively moderate cost of $2.5bn, the project is still going to face prospects of political instability in South Caucasus and Kurdish-populated areas of Eastern Turkey. Even should the political risk be totally eliminated, the gas will still need to be brought from Turkey through Balkans to more developed and mature markets of Central and Western Europe - all at additional cost. Even if these transit countries suddenly offer a market potential sufficient to sustain return on initial investment, more will be required to build additional infrastructure (regional and local gas grids, underground storage facilities, etc.). As far as I can see, the project is a no-go.</p>
<p>Which is not necessarily bad for us, Turkmens. All the more reason to start developing naitonal chemical industry, processing natural gas, oil and their various fractions into value-added goods with low long-haul transportation costs, or more power plants to sell electricity to neighbors. The Europeans will have to sort out their energy problems themselves, not at the account of locking in our economic prospects for another 20-30 years.</p>
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