Foul Mood
The recently established Turkmen dissident web site, Turkmenskaya Iskra (Turkmen Spark), recently reported the rare occurrence of anti-government protests in some areas of the country. In Turkmenbashi Square in Mary a statue of President Saparmurat brandishing a copy of the Rukhnama was damaged on February 17. Though the identity of the culprit is not yet known, the act was succeeded by widespread arrests and interrogations across the city. Meanwhile, national artist Amansary Khadjiev was summoned to Mary to repair the monument, which had the hand bearing the Rukhnama snapped off.
On the same day, in a town centre in the Oguzkhan area of the Mary velyat, a bucket of excrement was emptied onto the head of another statue of Niyazov. Two local residents, Ammanazar Durdiev and Serdar Karriev, were charged with the offence. Iskra reports that they have been transferred to Ashgabat, where are they are being detained in a Ministry for National Security, formerly KGB, detention centre. The aim of the interrogations is said to be that of establishing if the two protests were somehow related or organised in a coordinated fashion.
Finally, on February 18 leaflets calling for the overthrow of President Niyazov were found in the vicinity of the Rukhiyet palace in Ashgabat. Additional troops have been brought to Ashgabat and been put on a state of high alert.
The mood in Ashgabat was being described as tense, according to Iskra, in spite of the festivities that took take place in the city last week to mark the president’s birthday and flag day. The as yet unverified acts of protest are being attributed to discontent over the recent pensions reform.
on February 22nd, 2006 at 8:10 pm
Peter-
What is your read on this unrest bubbling in Turkmenistan? Is it at all analagous to the kind of unrest seen in Uzbekistan?
Also, do you think the defamation of the Rukhnama is a result of general frustration with the regime, or of a more Islamic nature?
Very interesting…
on February 22nd, 2006 at 8:11 pm
Peter-
What is your read on this unrest bubbling in Turkmenistan? Is it at all analagous to the kind of unrest seen in Uzbekistan?
Also, do you think the defamation of the Rukhnama is a result of general frustration with the regime, or of a more Islamic nature?
Very interesting…
-James
on February 22nd, 2006 at 8:46 pm
In all honesty, I am sceptical these specific incidents happened at all, but it is fair to assume that this type of thing must and does sometimes take place. No, it isn’t comparable to Uzbekistan insamuch as trouble there has been of a much more radical and sectoral nature.
If you look at other outbursts of popular anger in Uzbekistan other than Andijan, you find that it’s often traders and similar classes of citizenry that are most militant. This makes them more organised but conversely easier to placate, in theory.
Uzbekistan is probably not much better disposed in terms of quality of life than Turkmenistan, which suggests that grassroots discontent does not tell us a great deal about the scope for revolution, transition, or whatever else you want to call it.
I think the signs of grievance are newsworthy because they are so rare, and in the case of the bucket of excrement emptied over Niyazov’s head also quite colourful. The news is rare, but the fact that the population isn’t happy and may show it in its own way is not. Frankly, it’s a mystery to me where people go when they have been hounded out of practically every forum of social life that does not involve singing the president’s glory. Internal dissidence is a marginal story, but I’m at a loss to work out what and where the real story is.
Uzbekistan does have a very slight social pressure valve, but not Turkmenistan it seems to me. As depressing as it seems to think about, the only alternative for such a policed society is to regress to a pre-political stage. As always, I yield to my Turkmen friend Karakum for more constructive insights.
on February 22nd, 2006 at 8:51 pm
As for the Rukhnama, I think that anger directed towards any book that is mandatory reading in as many spheres of life as it is in Turkmenistan is quite understandable. I think it can be safely excluded that specific attacks are of a more literary than Islamic nature.
On a more controversial note, I am surprised that muslim devotees across the world never took, possibly violent, exception to the way in which Niyazov desecrated holy sites built in his tenure with his own foolish works. I will consult a specialist colleague on religious affairs on this matter. I’m not certain what standing Turkmen clerics enjoy in the wider Islamic community. Not very much in all probability.
on February 22nd, 2006 at 11:51 pm
Thanks Peter!
So would it be fair to say that you think this news is interesting (assuming it is true), but not significant?
Pre-political stage? Meaning that the police state is so complete that people have more or less given up on change? Can you think of anywhere else that has happened, either in the present day or historically?
Karakum, any thoughts?
-J
on February 23rd, 2006 at 1:16 am
Prior to the alleged attempt on Niyazov’s life in November 2002, there were reports of leaflets and anti-Niyazov materials littering the streets of Ashgabat. The culprit, it was assumed and later asserted, was Boris Shikhmuradov, Niyazov’s former confidant turned exiled leader in opposition. Seeing that Shikhmuradov was jailed after the coup is now most likely dead, the real answer still evades us. Locals claim, however, that Shikhmuradov was a very popular politician who could have rallied the masses, and his supposed presence in the capital made for a very tense and anxious city.
Dissent is usually done in private places and in the company of like-minded people. Open dissatisfaction with the regime is almost nonexistent, and would most likely be met with dismissal from one’s post or immediate jail time. Thus, to my knowledge, there are no pressure valves to speak of, or public forums for criticism and discourse. If anything, the acts mentioned above are isolated acts of vandalism or youthful overexuberance. I, for one, know that I would certaintly dump excrement on a presidential statue if I was made to study the Ruhnama for that many hours.
In regards to Turkmenskaya Iskra, I don’t quite buy it. For one, I have only once seen an armed Turkmen soldier (standing outside of Niyazov’s palace), and thus I can’t quite believe that armed troops are being called into Ashgabat to put down a supposed insurrection (Niyazov doesn’t want guns in the hands of easily malleable 18 year old conscripts). Also, opposition sites are a dime a dozen these days, and what better way to start up and grab attention than by claiming that dissent is on the rise in Turkmenistan-the writers know the authorities monitor these types of sites. Even the name, “Turkmenskaya Iskra”, in contrast to Watan or Gundogar, makes me think that the writers are old communists or hard liners more interested in manipulating opinion and starting a spark than actually relaying truthful events.
on February 23rd, 2006 at 7:06 am
Number of important issues raised; not sure if I can add value on any, but here are my 2 cents:
Firstly, the news seem to be grossly exaggerated; at least I am not able to confirm. As mentioned already, Iskra is a new outlet and, as such, may be driven by a “market entry” agenda, while still lacking capacity for field reportage. Even if there were protests, the claim about change in military dispositions is just laughable (why bother? since when are the troops stationed in the God foresaken Tejen more combat ready and/or loyal than elite forces in and around Ashgabat?).
Secondly, not sure what the regress to pre-political stage means, but frankly — given the present conditions, lack of any social pressure valves whatsoever, etc. — post-Niyazov could mean almost anything. It could look similar to post-Stalin, or post-Aristide, or post-Mao, or post-Saddam, or post-Franco… you name it. I think there are options (from horrible to not so bad) and, as a Turkmen, I have to be more hopeful.
Thirdly, one thing I can be more certain about is that Islamization is not going to be such a threat. Islam is just not a factor there: neither in politics, nor in communal life. If one is looking for a broad brush analogies, we, Turkmens, are as devout believers as Kazakhs. If anything has happened re the role of Islam in the last decade, it is its further marginalization thanks to all these sycophant mullahs, huge marble mosques, etc…
Finally, I would subject any news coming out from Mary to double scrutiny. Dashowuz and Charjew are more depressed and disenfranchised, but they are too peripheral to be able to set a nation-wide trend (besides, they are not closely linked to each other). Balkan is traditionally the most liberal, individualistic, rebellious, but the population is small and too dispersed, while Ahal is just too close to Ashgabat.
Mary is different in many respects: most populous; most enterpreneurial; proud traditions; closely linked to Charjew economically and to Ahal and Ashgabat economically and tribally; at once central and provincial. When the change will start, it would start either from Ashgabat (eg. coup d’etat) or from Mary (mass movement).
on February 23rd, 2006 at 10:28 am
Apologies for the pretentious term pre-political. What I meant by this is that in the absence of any civil society, which in even in seemingly innocuous forms can be interpreted by authorities as political activism of some type, people begin to revert to values that are not consonant with political dialogue. The point is that the evolution of political mentalities after the dissolution of the Soviet Union has stalled in Turkmenista, if not gone into reverse, and it is only the humane qualities of Turkmen society that will prevent it from disintegration when the current order falls apart.
I agree completely with Karakum’s views on the new web site. Iskra’s reports were journalistic in only the very loosest understanding of the word. However, it would be mistaken to dismiss it out of hand. I’m assuming that they have the means for reporting such incidents, though they may colour the news according to their own ends, be they political, commercial or whatever.
on February 23rd, 2006 at 2:03 pm
Personally, I also tend to be sceptical towards that kind of opposition-in-exile outlets. In my experience they often tend to turn on emotionalism and rumors i.e. not very professional.
I have also the impression that the Turkmen opposition in exile is not very streamlined or efficient. What do we have: some mothballed perestroïka-era intelligentisa and -dissidents (irrelevant today); a number of regime ex-cronies who fell in disgrace for various reasons (many of who are not any better than the incumbent); ethnic Russians from Turkmenistan (marginalized); the Communist Party (obsolete/merely based on nostalgia); and some westernized youngsters (who are not really representative for/connected to Turkmen society at large either).
Either case, sooner or later that regime will collapse as all such regimes do.
“When the change will start, it would start either from Ashgabat (eg. coup d’etat) or from Mary (mass movement).”
Yes. Or a combination of both, st. along the lines of Ceaucescu’s Romania in ‘89: popular protest (Timisoara)+palace coup (Bukarest).
on February 23rd, 2006 at 2:41 pm
Ataman,
These are interesting insights, but my feeling is that dissent and/or opposition is probably not a major factor in a country like Turkmenistan. Judging by the standard ways in which the highly personalised regimes like that of Niyazov end, the probability is an exclusively palace-based overthrow.
This could, of course, take many forms. Niyazov is neither young nor healthy, and yet whenever he succumbs to whatever condition he may be susceptible to, he will not be surrounded by the careers cadres in the mould of the Brezhnev generation. Only those near Niyazov will be in a position to accurately judge when the moment to act will be. And act they will, if they have any sense.
As an aside, maybe I’m just gullible here, these regular promises of elections that Niyazov keeps making look to me like the groundwork for future negotiations. Assembling a pseudo-democracy, at least in Uzbek style, is probably Niyazov’s only way of avoiding ending his life at the barrel of a gun.
Romania is an intriguing parallel, but you can’t forget that those events fit into a whole global wave of regime collapses that are hardly going to be replicated in Central Asia. That notwithstanding, Ceaucescu and Niyazov strike me as remarkably similar in their obstinate refusal to concede an inch to the real situation of their fellow countrymen. But I wonder how many Turkmen are writing letters to their president complaining about their standard of life, as the Romanians did in the eighties. Not many, I’m guessing.
As for the exiled opposition, I am heartened that it is so varied, if sometimes naive. The inefficiency of the opposition, however, can simply be explained by the lack of reference among locals. Until a group can really be said to be shaping its policies on the real will of the people then they will fail to capture widespread imagination.
The Iskra story, as someone suggested, was an obvious attempt to be seen as representing the views of people on the ground. I agree that inventing or exaggerating stories about local activism is a pretty Soviet tactic. Though the one thing that can be said for the efforts of the Soviet disinformation brigade is that, damn it, they worked. With all due respect to Iskra, however, the operation looks slightly amateurish and lacking in credibility.
However, the title has meaning that may go beyond the realms of Bolshevik revanchism. As it says on the website the original Iskra was disbanded in 1995, which marked not the end of the Soviet Union but the beginning of the extreme pseudo-ethnic nationalism championed by Niyazov. While I have no great sympathy for communist die-hards, there is grounds for understanding the appeal of a political orientation that rejects both the current personality cult and the artificial return to supposedly pre-Soviet values.
As with everything, we shall have to wait and see how Iskra turns out.
on February 23rd, 2006 at 3:21 pm
Thanx Peter!
“As an aside, maybe I’m just gullible here, these regular promises of elections that Niyazov keeps making look to me like the groundwork for future negotiations.”
Yes you’re gullibe. Like in Uzbekistan, promises of reform, elections etc. are merely bargaining pitches toward the West and the IFI and their $$$ in particular. Nothing more, nothing less. Zaïre’s Mobutu, for instance, did exactly the same for years.
“As for the exiled opposition, I am heartened that it is so varied, if sometimes naive. The inefficiency of the opposition, however, can simply be explained by the lack of reference among locals.”
Yes. Plus, I am not even sure that the average Turkmen in Turkmenistan (or Uzbek in Uzbekistan for that matter) cares about, or even likes/trusts, the opposition in exile at all.
“Though the one thing that can be said for the efforts of the Soviet disinformation brigade is that, damn it, they worked.”
Yes they worked and the result (also of other factors) was the Soviet collapse. Today we see a run-down repetition of teh same scenario with all these tin-pot tyrants and their cronies: like their Soviet predecessors, they *think* that they are smart and that they can outwit everyone, and for a while it works indeed… only to end up in disaster as we have seen in the past.
on February 23rd, 2006 at 3:22 pm
Why would “dissent and opposition be not a major factor in a country like Turkmenistan”? Country is a country, what’s the point? Regimes may vary, but dissent and opposition is always a factor, anywhere.
Yes, coup d’etat seem to be more (or at least not less) likely possible than mass protests, but both are mere modalities of the regime change and not necessarily indicative of what will happen next. Talking about “standards of personalized regimes”, as I said, anything is possible:
(1) collective leadership arrangements and limited deconservation of the regime (post-Stalin)
(2) collective leadership arrangements and gradual reform and modernization (post-Mao)
(3) genuine democratization, international reintegration and reform (post-Franco; perhaps, post-Ceausescou)
(4) circle of violence and a slight hope for a successful international intervention (post-Aristide)
(5) sectarian/tribal antagonism and threat of disintegration (post-Saddam), etc.
on February 23rd, 2006 at 5:28 pm
“Regimes may vary, but dissent and opposition is always a factor, anywhere.”
Yep.
It is naïve to assume that there is no dissent in TM and UZB and that everything is just nice and fine and ‘pod kontrol’. There may be no *formal* and *organised* dissent or opposition indeed and if there is that opposition does not necessarily represent ‘deep’ TM or UZB (e.g. that ’sunny coalition’ in UZB).
Yet don’t underestimate the role of ‘grass-roots elites’ and -opinion leaders. Things can go quite fast somethimes.
For TM and UZB I consider a combination of a Romania ‘89 and Haïti post-Aristide most probable.
on February 23rd, 2006 at 6:43 pm
The core to my arguments is exactly that dissent does not seem to be visible in Turkmenistan. If there is, it is manifested in the disaffection similar to that of stagnation in the USSR in the seventies. This is a hugely damaging process because people in this type of situation begin to feel that their own interests and those of the collective can never be reconciled. My opinion is formed purely by theoretical abstraction with a little bit of study of the region, but I don’t think it’s without basis.
Elite negotiation is not, in my view, a form of dissent. And “grass-roots elites” is a contradiction in terms. If there are any opinion-shapers other than the president currently operating in Turkmenistan, I would love to know who they are.
Karakum’s models for the potential for fall-out post-Niyazov are interesting, though I still insist that if Niyazov doesn’t drop dead some time in the next five years or so, he may be compelled to arrive at some type of leadership accomodation. It need not be a result of power conflicts, but just a natural conclusion of the fact that a weak old man cannot survive if all his natural successors are also potentially his enemies.
on February 23rd, 2006 at 7:40 pm
Peter has a good point. There are not any other opinion shapers or grass roots leaders in Turkmenistan because they have all been co-opted by Niyazov, thrown in jail, or are in exile. Niyazov is the only person that shapes opinion, without a doubt. This may be hard to believe, but it is true. And I also do not understand “grass-roots elites”, or I’m not familiar with this idea.
In the absence of fair elections or civil society, what good are private grumblings and dissent? Yes, they are there, underneath it all, but when dissent cannot be vented in a public forum or gather support, the end result is complacency and stagnation (as Peter mentioned). In Turkmenistan, as long as dissent stays private, nonvisible, disorganized, and unaddressed by opinion shapers (if indeed there exist any besides Niyazov), Niyazov will rule in comfort.
Also, I don’t think we can just apply combination models to post-Niyazov Turkmenistan, as if it will fit into a certain mold. Additionally, the models of Romania, ‘89 and post-Aristide Haiti do not even come close to capturing the specific conditions we see in Turkmenistan (Romania being a part of a larger movement in Eastern Europe, Haiti being a country that had experienced political turmoil for over a century). More appropriate to our topic would be recent events in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Ilham Aliyev’s ascendancy to the Presidency in Azerbaijan, and Askar Akaev’s abdication in Kyrgyzstan.
on February 24th, 2006 at 6:07 am
Peter, yours is solid logic; yet I think that Ataman is also right in questioning some of the assumptions often made abroad about factors shaping political dynamics in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan.
on February 24th, 2006 at 3:33 pm
Dag,
It seems I overlooked a couple of comments awaiting moderation. Apologies for that. For anyone who has been following this exchange, make sure not to overlook the points above.
on February 24th, 2006 at 9:29 pm
No problem Peter. I must say that I agree with you and tend to disagree with Ataman. I don’t understand the term “grass-roots elites”, and even if the term is grounded in literature, it surely doesn’t apply to Turkmenistan. There are no local opinion shapers in Turkmenistan. The only individuals that come close to being revered on the same level as Niyazov are all dead (Makhtumkuly, Gorogly, his mother, father, etc.) and thus don’t pose a threat. Of course, there are popular people on the local level (singers, artists, athletes), but if they have not been thrown in jail or exiled, they have usually been co-opted by Niyazov and are thus unlikely to oppose the regime.
Of course there is dissent and opposition but it is private, disorganized, and sporadic. There are no public forums for debate or discourse on politics. Like Peter said, when dissent is kept private and can never be vented, it results in complacency and stagnation. Yes, quietly simmering dissent can sometimes explode into open outrage, but only when the people are led on by opinion shapers and local leaders. In Turkmenistan these leaders have already been tainted or corrupted by Niyazov’s extensive reach and power, and thus the idea of things “going quite fast” does not apply to Turkmenistan. And, as I said before, the vast majority of people in Turkmenistan, even if they don’t publicly endorse Niyazov, are content with the status quo.
Also, the assassination attempt in November of 2002 and the clean up that followed effectively ended any progress that the Turkmen opposition in exile made. Shikhmuradov was by far the most popular politician in the country next to Niyazov, and he had the best chance of shaking things up. With him dead, the disparate opposition groups are most likely to feud and conjure up new ways to grab headlines (much like Turkmenskaya Iskra recently did). Local Turkmen don’t trust them either. The only way opposition members in exile will play a roll in Turkmenistan post-Niyazov is if they manage to get back into the country after the President’s death and succeed in rousing support. But, without a local base of power (due to the KNB’s rounding up of informants and loyalists), this is an unlikely scenario.
on February 25th, 2006 at 2:19 pm
Though I agree with many of Dag’s (and Peter’s) comments, let me offer another perspective on some of them:
- Yes, public forums and discourse are important; yes, they are crucial if you are to build democratic society (whatever that term means) tomorrow. But did repressions and stagnation in USSR preclude reforms of 80s and 90s? Weren’t Chinese, Greeks, Turks - you name them - more depressed and debilitated at respective periods of their history and just before they embarked on their own reforms? Let’s just not state the obvious and try to generalize and moralize about its impact on mentalities etc., ok?
- No independent opinion-makers? You got to be kidding. I’ll give you just few names: how about Muradberdy Sopyev, an elderly leader and oligarch, who has been discredited by his support of Niyazov, but is still immensely popular and listened to, especially in Ahal? How about Akmurat Kuliev and Kurbanbibi Atajanova - heads of two competing security services, political operations and business cartels? If they are not “dependent”, then tell me how “independent” is Niyazov. There’s at least another dozen of independent opinion makers of the regional scale.
- Did you say Shikhmuradov was “by far the most popular” and “rallying the masses”? Are you trying to convince yourself here? Shihmuradov was by far the most unpopular, next to Niyazov. Lest you think people are naive and blind not to see his entourage’s almost extravagant corruption schemes, hiw own role in creating the personality cult, helping to set a drug traffic through a well-known Turkish mob group, after all? Rallying who?! The guy couldn’t even speak Turkmen; give me a break. (Btw, I hope he is alive).
- Forget about the dissident-in-exile as a sensible opposition, even in rousing support after the president’s death. However you measure the local power base, if anybody is expecing there will be a power vacuum after Niyazov’s death, there simply won’t. The place is just packed with groups and people with an established power base and much stronger competencies (on how to grab and take power), some of them will have external partners to help to gain international legitimacy, if needed.
- Murad Niyazov as a successor? Though not entirely impossible, that still takes a leap of imagination. Murad is said to be not an indecent person, but as a political figure he is no comparison even to Ilham of mid-90s. I don’t want to go into details, but, most importantly, while Heydar was always more of an asset for Ilham, Murad’s father is and will be his strongest political liability.
Bottomline, as I have tried to explain already, whether nothing will change before the president drops dead, or there will be a coup d’etat, or mass movement, or Murad - these are just modalities of the regime change. They will explain how things will start to change (or unravel), but not what will be ultimately happening. This is why I suggested some “models” of “personalized regime changes”. Of course, each country has its own specifics, who would disagree, and these models are not blueprints, but they could help to explain some hypothetical or possible dynamics.
Again, let’s not make broad assumptions (this is where I agree with Ataman). I prefer raising these questions and entertaining various options to someone’s stating the obvious, moralizing about perceived societal deficiencies, and then offering opinionated analyses. But I tend to agree with Dag and Peter on all other points.
on February 25th, 2006 at 4:18 pm
“- No independent opinion-makers? You got to be kidding. I’ll give you just few names”
Very interesting.
Besides that level of society, I was thinking more (cf. ‘grass roots elite’) about people who are quite low-profile but play key roles in the so-called ‘informal’ or ’shadow economy’ that is important for the daily survival of substantial amounts of people in almost all ex-Soviet republics incl. TM.
“- Did you say Shikhmuradov was “by far the most popular” and “rallying the masses”? Are you trying to convince yourself here?”
He was actually seen/hyped that way by some Western and Russian commentators. Yet he is a prime example of what I said earlier: a former Niyazov minion who fell in disgrace and then became “opposition”.
“- Forget about the dissident-in-exile as a sensible opposition, even in rousing support after the president’s death.”
Agree. Even if they return they will likely be shunned by the people in TM as well as UZB, as e.g. Iraqi exile dissidents and political refugees were when they went back.
Also forget about the Soviet era intelligentsia and their offspring for those are either: out of the country; marginalized; co-opted/recycled by the regime; or working for international orgs./NGOs and thus often form what Olivier Roy calls a ‘disfunctional elite’.
on February 25th, 2006 at 4:42 pm
“Again, let’s not make broad assumptions (this is where I agree with Ataman).”
See, if you want a good example of a misperception of political dynamics, look at what happenend in Kyrgyzstan last year.
Some though that there was going to be a repetition of the Ukraine scenario, and that was why some media and anelysts hyped the so-called pro-Western opposition around Otunbayeva — ‘the Kyrgyz Cory Aquino’
— and the Kel Kel students’ group.
Today we see that both Otunbayeva and Kel Kel are sidelined if not marginalised.
One of the reasons of course is, that they naïvely compromised themselves too much with the US embassy in Bishkek. But another, more important one IMO is, that a couple of hundreds of westernized city students and local internat. NGO employees who think they’re smart and cool do not represent or even have any link to ‘deep’ Kyrgyzstan, which is a predominantly rural and clanic society. That is not meant to be derogatory that is just a fact also in UZB, TAJ etc.
on February 25th, 2006 at 4:53 pm
I think there is a distinction to be made between generalisations and comparisons. Ataman’s Romanian parallel was a useful one and should, in joint with more mature reporting about Central Asia in general, form the basis of the kind of comparative analysis of regime change. Turkmenistan is, after all, a result of Soviet meddling, and we have a vast literature about how power and politics developed in Russia and other countries behind the Iron Curtain.
on February 25th, 2006 at 5:49 pm
Well, let’s get the definitions straight.
Turkmenistan is actually the result of (arguably successful) socio-political engineering, designed mostly in Moscow, but implemented through coopting the Turkmen elite. This was complex and complicated intervention, it came not without costs but gave birth to a modern nation. Peter, you don’t want to even go there. With all respect, let’s not mix opinions with facts.
on February 26th, 2006 at 2:15 am
There is no doubt that Soviet intervention was complex, but it was imposed. Therefore, whatever you want to call it, it was interference of some kind. Solutions and perspectives on the future of the country must inevitably take this into account. From the Western contemporary culture studies point of view, imperial imposition is often interpreted as a destructive process. One may or may not agree with this, but addressing these matters is also crucial to understanding the future of Central Asian identities.
on February 26th, 2006 at 3:16 pm
You will excuse me for not knowing that this discourse is within the “Western contemporary culture studies point of view”.
Besides, you seem to having made judgments about our past, I am not sure if that helps in discussing perspectives on the future.
on February 26th, 2006 at 4:28 pm
I think that judgements about the past are at the heart of perspectives on the future. If we disagree about the emphasis of historical surveys, that’s another matter.
Incidentally, a book on Turkmen cultural history that you have spoken praisingly about, Adrienne Lynn Edgar’s Tribal Nation, is particularly useful for us outsiders as a starting point in this type of study. Beyond the regime-change that we have spoken about, the future leaders of Turkmenistan will have to undertake the cultural reconstruction of the country. And that is what I really intended to say with the comments above.
on February 26th, 2006 at 4:43 pm
That’s what you think. More conventional view is this: analyzing the past is helpful, judging it not.
Even trying to broaden the scope of your argument by referring to other studies, is not going to help strengthening it.
My friendly advise to the area students burdened by cold war era cliches and making attempts to put perspective on our future: if you want to be listened to don’t even approach us with your suppositions on the soviet history, of which we are proud.
And please, don’t moralize about “the cultural reconstructions of the country” - this is on the agenda of all leaders in any country at any given time.
on February 26th, 2006 at 7:49 pm
I’m not sure what it is we disagree about any more.
I think that the legacy of Soviet politics has been negative in many, if not most, respects. The way that it eventually disintegrated is instructive in studying Turkmen prospects. We may disagree on this matter, but I actually don’t quite understand how.
Cultural reconstruction _is_ a question when identity is forged, the way Niyazov’s regime has done. I don’t know if it is moralistic or patronising to say that, but there you are. There’s tons more to discuss on this subject, and I realise further nuance and factual detail is needed, but it is good to have it on the table, so to speak.
on February 27th, 2006 at 5:41 am
I posted the Russian translation of this discussion on my own blog (except Peter’s last comment, which I didn’t see before).
Justed wanted to thank all for incisive comments; I enjoyed it enormously and learned lot from each of you. I also want to thank Peter for providing “open political forum” and facilitating “public discourse”!
on February 27th, 2006 at 5:16 pm
Yeah, thanks for a great conversation. Its always nice to chew the fat on Turkmenistan. Even though we range from “outsiders” to “area studies students” to “Turkmen” to “NGO employees who think they’re smart”, its nice to know we can throw together quite a good debate on a difficult subject.
Karakum, you don’t seem to be at a loss for information that is somewhat hard to come by. So I have a question for you, hopefully you’ll know. Kurbanbibi Atajanova, who you mentioned before as a local leader/opinion shaper/etc., has been the Prosecutor General in Turkmenistan for a while now (since 1995? i’m not sure). She seems to be Niyazov’s hatchet woman in most matters, but I was impressed to hear that she has been active for over ten years. That is a pretty good shelf life for someone that close to the President. You don’t have to go into details if you don’t want to, but I was hoping you could give me some background information on her, especially how she came to that position and has managed to hold it for that long. She is a very interesting figure (not to mention quite scary), and obviously a person of high importance.
on March 2nd, 2006 at 7:51 am
I recall that the “opposition sites” have written extensively about her (career, family, etc.) so you might want just to check their archives. Being woman, she is considered handicapped to challenge Niyazov, yet is good for providing counterbalance to Akmurad Rejepov.
BTW, if anyone interested, the Russian translation of this discussion on my blog is generating some additional insights.