President Saparmurat Niyazov’s visit to Moscow has generated considerable press coverage in the Russian press. Predictably, this has much to do with the fate of energy relations between Russia and Turkmenistan, not to speak of the Ukrainian factor. However, the most in-depth English language analysis to appear so far has been in the The Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor. The article, by Jamestown analyst Vladimir Socor, picks up on a number of themes featured in the Russian press. The article is well worth a read, if only for a U.S. and EU-centric perspective of the Turkmen gas issue:

On January 22-23, Niyazov paid a working visit to Moscow for discussions with President Vladimir Putin and Gazprom chairman Alexei Miller on energy issues. Prior to Niyazov’s visit, officials in Ashgabat had publicly indicated that Turkmenistan would ask for a price increase on its gas, from $60 to $80 or $85 per 1,000 cubic meters, in line with the rise of international prices for energy. On the visit’s eve, however, Turkmenistan’s Moscow embassy denied that information as a rumor intended to spoil the atmosphere of Niyazov’s meeting with Putin. Apparently, Niyazov had blinked — or decided to postpone the demand until later this year, preparatory to the 2007 supply contracts. Russian and Turkmen official accounts of the visit are tight-lipped. They merely speak of bilateral cooperation in transport and delivery of Turkmen gas in the “eastern and western sectors” — i.e., for Russia’s use and for re-export via Russia.

All in all, the verdict of the Russian press was not wholly positive. Vremya Novostei, for example, in an article entitled “Much Ado About Nothing” noted that there was no discernible aim to Niyazov’s visit. A theme raised in the piece, echoed by other journalists, was that one possible aim might have been that of eliciting recognition for Turkmenistan’s role in normalizing European energy supplies.
An additional aspect to the encounter was the opportunity to develop what has been described as a “substantial partnership” between Russia and Turkmenistan, involving extensive collaboration in large energy projects related to the transportation, processing and the sale of Turkmen gas.
According to Vremya Novostei, Niyazov was also keen to emphasize his enthusiasm for further developing an alternative pipeline along the Caspian coast. The paper described this project as being Niyazov’s dream, which would enable him to increase gas exports while circumventing Uzbekistan. However, neither Gazprom nor Putin have displayed any approval for this idea, a decision that Vremya Novostei attributes to Turkmenistan’s persistent failure to supply reliable data on the size of its reserves.
An article by Andrei Kolesnikov in Kommersant added some colourful details to the account of the five-minute joint briefing by the presidents of Turkmenistan and Russia before their behind-closed-doors discussion. Kolesnikov writes that several Turkmen journalists were in attendance, though none of them dared to ask any questions. Meanwhile, the first secretary of the Turkmen Embassy in Moscow, Grigory Kolodin, loudly asked for Kolesnikiv to be barred from the building on the grounds that he intentionally confused Turkmens and Tajiks in previous reports for his newspaper.
Kolesnikov also remarked on Niyazov’s unusual decision to join Putin in the meeting room without his extensive retinue of advisors. Putin meanwhile was accompanied by his personal assistant Sergei Prikhodko.
A much quoted line by Putin related to his call for the review of the legal and contractual basis of relations between Ashgabat and Moscow, so as to extend agreement purely from energy issues to other spheres. Kolesnikov took this to be an implicit guarantee of security assistance, in particular in the form of help towards the development of a Turkmen navy, a notion which Niyazov is also said to be keen on.
Kolesnikov’s final point of interest concerned Turkmenistan’s need to deepen bonds with Russia in the wake of Niyazov’s strategic error of backing Hashemi Rafsanjani in the recent Iranian election. Rafsanjani, whose family has well established links with the Iranian energy industry, would have been favoured by Niyazov, who was keen to build on ties with Tehran. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, however, has proved to be less enamoured with speculation on energy markets, going so far as to call for the re-nationalization of the oil industry. This unexpected turn of events has significantly cooled relations between Tehran and Ashgabat, which now means Niyazov has had to turn to Putin for a strategic alliance.
Pro-Kremlin Rossiiskaya Gazeta notes that a Ukranian delegation seized on the opportunity of Niyazov’s visit to obtain further guarantees on gas supplies. The article also mentions Niyazov’s reference to Turkmenistan’s role as a mediating factor in European gas disputes. As in other reports, it is hinted that Niyazov resents his country being used as a geopolitical pawn in such arguments.
Rossiiskaya Gazeta also relates that Niyazov made remarks about his desire for exports of Turkmen gas to be directed eastwards as well as westwards, a reference reflected in the title of the article: “Go East!” The ostensible target of such eastward developments would be Japan and/or China.
Rossiiskaya Gazeta’s hypothesis for Ashgabat’s preparedness to deepen diplomatic relations is that Niyazov hopes to rely on Russian assistance in the construction of the Trans-Afghan Pipeline. The article ends by reminding the readers of Putin’s pledge to further formalize Turkmen-Russian relations.
Business daily Vedomosti opens by noting that Niyazov did not raise the issue of a hike in gas prices, as previously anticipated. However, according to a Kremlin source Niyazov brought up the matter of payment for gas delivered to Ukraine.
Nezavismaya Gazeta’s article, written by Natalia Melikova, was a particularly sarcastic contribution, commenting extensively on Niyazov’s appearance:

“Ah, Vladimir Vladimirovich,” Niyazov exclaimed, raising his right hand in greeting. In the glitter of the chandelier of the Kremlin meeting room his diamond ring sparkled. The presidents shook hands and sat in their armchairs. The Turkmen president raised his left hand to his face, as if to show his second diamond ring. However, it was not the ring that stuck out, but his light grey socks which, as well jarring with his black shoes, did not match the standard dress protocol for this kind of occasion.
Putin “intimately greeted” Niyazov, having noted how “pleased he was to meet him again.”
“Relations between our two countries have developed well on the whole, and the growth of trade has been healthy,” said Putin in his customary fashion.
“At the end of last year, Russia and Turkmenistan signed an agreement on the delivery of energy supplies,” reminded the president; though neither his interlocutor nor the journalists present needed reminding. At that point Niyazov linked fingers and placed them on his stomach, again displaying his bejewelled hands.

Finally, Gazeta introduced its piece by also referring to the presence in Moscow of the Ukrainian delegation and the aim of the meeting as a bid to establish the tri-lateral basis for future energy dialogue.
Gazeta also suggests that Turkmenistan sold inexistent gas reserves as a way of circumventing Gazprom’s pipeline monopoly. As a result, in spite of specific contractual obligations, Turkmenistan can play its customers off one another. Gazeta, however, claims that Moscow has been “forgiving” of this strategy, presumably in view of future strategic opportunities.

UPDATE: Eurasianet has also published an insightful report on Monday’s meeting

UPDATE 2: A little bit more background on Ukraine’s latest statement on its position regarding gas supplies from Turkmenistan, via a Prime-Tass report on Tuesday:

Ukraine expects to sign agreements on supplies of Turkmen natural gas to Ukraine until 2031 during a visit of Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurat Niyazov to Ukraine in March, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov said Tuesday.
Ukraine currently has an agreement on gas supplies with Turkmenistan until December 31, 2006, Yekhanurov said. Under this agreement Ukraine will purchase a total of 40 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas this year for USD 50 per 1,000 cubic meters in the first half of the year and for USD 60 per 1,000 cubic meters in the second half of the year.
Ukraine has fully paid for natural gas supplied by Turkmenistan in 2005 both in cash and in kind, Yekhanurov said.
In January-March Ukraine plans to repay its old debts for gas supplied from Turkmenistan, including debts for gas supplied in 1993-1994, Yekhanurov said.